REALIDADE & NARRATIVAS
A Ucrânia está ganhando a batalha no Twitter, mas no mundo real Kiev está perdendo a luta pelo DonbassAs reivindicações de que a Ucrânia está preparada para a vitória no terreno são, na melhor das hipóteses, os desejos de Kiev e Washington
A cobertura da mídia ocidental sobre o conflito da Ucrânia tem sido tão histericamente unilateral e divorciada da realidade, que provavelmente é apenas uma questão de tempo até que o antigo "Ali cômico" iraquiano seja retirado da aposentadoria para insistir que não há russos avançando em direção à linha de frente do exército ucraniano. Enquanto isso, os combates atuais continuam a resultar em uma série de derrotas para as forças maltratadas de Kiev, que já perderam o controle de duas grandes cidades, apesar do apoio sem precedentes dos EUA e seus aliados.
Enquanto os oficiais americanos [do deep state] trabalham com o governo do presidente ucraniano Volodymyr Zelensky para criar uma percepção da vitória de Kiev contra os militares russos, Moscou se prepara para enfrentar com uma dura dose de realidade.
O Secretário de Estado dos EUA, Antony Blinken, no calcanhar de uma dramática visita à capital ucraniana de Kiev onde, junto com o Secretário de Defesa Lloyd Austin, ele se encontrou com Zelensky, testemunhou perante o Congresso que o objetivo dos ucranianos na luta contra seu conflito de dois meses com a Rússia "seria empurrar os russos para fora do território que eles estão tentando ocupar no leste da Ucrânia".
Blinken acrescentou que a administração do presidente americano Joe Biden estava dando "total apoio" a Kiev para alcançar este objetivo. O Secretário de Estado acrescentou que o objetivo de Zelensky era degradar os militares russos para que não pudessem atacar a Ucrânia no "próximo mês, no próximo ano ou em cinco anos", ecoando sentimentos semelhantes expressos por Lloyd Austin, que havia declarado que o objetivo dos EUA era "ver a Rússia enfraquecida" para que não pudesse "fazer o tipo de coisas que fez [na Ucrânia]".
O otimismo compartilhado de Blinken, Austin e Zelensky vem do abraço conjunto de uma narrativa da operação militar russa contra a Ucrânia que sustenta que os russos estão em vias de sofrer uma derrota estratégica na Ucrânia.
Mas em um sinal de que esta narrativa pode representar pouco mais do que um pensamento de desejo por parte destes três líderes, o Presidente do Estado-Maior Conjunto dos Estados Unidos, General Mark Milley, teve uma tomada mais matizada, observando que se a Rússia escapasse com o que ele chamou de sua "agressão" contra a Ucrânia "sem custos", então "a ordem de segurança internacional global" que está em vigor desde o final da Segunda Guerra Mundial seria posta em risco.
Longe de projetar um senso de otimismo quanto ao resultado do conflito russo-ucraniano, as declarações de Milley refletiam um senso de urgência que vem com o reconhecimento de que a guerra na Ucrânia chegou a um momento crítico.
A lacuna entre percepção e realidade quando se trata de avaliar o conflito russo-ucraniano é um resultado direto da natureza confusa do próprio conflito, onde uma campanha de propaganda bem oleada conduzida pela Ucrânia e seus parceiros ocidentais, tanto governamentais quanto da mídia, contrasta com um esforço russo de relações públicas reticente em aprofundar as metas e objetivos estratégicos russos, muito menos os detalhes do dia-a-dia da luta no terreno. O resultado é uma guerra de informação na qual duas narrativas concorrentes geram um conflito desigual, e a percepção é, em última instância, enganada pela realidade.
Algumas verdades duras
Quando a operação militar na Ucrânia entra em seu terceiro mês, surgiram algumas verdades duras que estão alterando a forma como tanto as forças armadas russas como a guerra moderna serão avaliadas no futuro. Poucos analistas - incluindo este autor - esperavam uma resistência séria para durar mais de um mês. De fato, o General Milley havia informado ao Congresso, no início de fevereiro, durante reuniões de portas fechadas, que uma invasão russa em larga escala na Ucrânia poderia resultar na queda de Kiev dentro de 72 horas.
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Por que o resultado das conversações Rússia-Ucrânia mudará o cenário de segurança da Europa
Havia várias razões para tal avaliação. A primeira e mais importante foi a extensa preparação que havia sido conduzida pela Rússia antes da incursão militar. O movimento de centenas de milhares de tropas junto com seus equipamentos e os meios logísticos para sustentar tanto homens quanto material em combate não é um exercício trivial, e a Rússia havia se engajado em exercícios militares que se estenderam ao longo de vários meses, aperfeiçoando tal logística. Os militares russos são liderados por oficiais que se destacam no trabalho e preparação do pessoal, e assumir que eles tinham planejado todas as possibilidades que poderiam ser encontradas no campo de batalha não é uma proposta estranha.
Doutrinalmente, o exército russo foi configurado para o tipo de guerra para a qual havia preparado, onde suas vantagens esmagadoras em massa e poder de fogo foram otimizadas para produzir os próprios resultados do campo de batalha previstos pela maioria dos observadores - a destruição das defesas inimigas em profundidade com fogo em massa, seguida por um ataque agressivo blindado que penetrou profundamente nas áreas traseiras inimigas, semeando confusão e perturbação, levando à rápida perda de eficácia do combate por parte daqueles que estavam sendo atacados.
Uma guerra russo-ucraniana seria sempre principalmente uma guerra terrestre; não se esperava que nem a Força Aérea ucraniana nem sua Marinha apresentassem uma resistência sustentada e viável a seus homólogos russos. Embora o Exército ucraniano tivesse sido treinado e equipado como uma força virtual da OTAN desde 2015, a realidade era que tinha sofrido uma rápida expansão a partir de 2014, quando pôde colocar em campo cerca de 6.000 soldados prontos para o combate, até sua composição de operações pré-militares de cerca de 150.000 soldados organizados em 24 brigadas. A expectativa de que a Ucrânia fosse capaz de aperfeiçoar mais do que operações de armamento combinado do tamanho de um batalhão básico (ou seja, o emprego coordenado de forças de manobra com artilharia e apoio aéreo) era um desejo.
Embora a Ucrânia tivesse colocado um grande esforço na transição de um exército totalmente recruta em 2014 para um exército onde cerca de 60% de seu pessoal de combate eram soldados profissionais contratados, liderados por oficiais subalternos experientes, não se pode criar tal força em tão pouco tempo. A liderança de pequenas unidades do tipo que representa a cola que mantém uma força militar unida sob a tensão e a coação de um combate sustentado simplesmente não teve tempo suficiente para tomar posse e amadurecer no exército ucraniano, levando muitos a avaliar que ela se dobraria quando colocada sob a tensão da guerra doutrinária russa.
A análise a seguir é proveniente de reportagens disponíveis ao público feitas por jornalistas integrados aos militares russos e às forças da República Popular de Donetsk, bem como de briefings do Ministério da Defesa russo e declarações feitas pelo lado ucraniano.
Na primeira semana após o início da operação russa, ficou claro para a maioria das pessoas que muitas das suposições que haviam sido feitas eram falhas e/ou equivocadas. Antes de tudo, Moscou havia optado por não empregar suas forças de acordo com a doutrina padrão, optando em vez disso por uma abordagem leve, que parecia nascer de um esforço concertado para minimizar as baixas civis e os danos à infraestrutura civil que, por sua vez, derivava de um mal-entendido fundamental da realidade da situação no terreno na Ucrânia.
A purga relatada de 150 oficiais do 5º Departamento do Serviço Federal de Segurança da Rússia (FSB), responsáveis pelas operações no chamado "near abroad" (que inclui a Ucrânia), juntamente com a prisão de Sergei Beseda, o antigo chefe do departamento, sugere que a Rússia havia sofrido uma falha de inteligência que não se via desde o fracasso israelense em prever a travessia egípcia do Canal de Suez durante a Guerra do Yom Kippur de outubro de 1973.
Embora o governo russo tenha permanecido caracteristicamente rígido sobre qualquer possível falha no trabalho do 5º Departamento antes do início da operação militar, as declarações da liderança russa sugerindo que os militares ucranianos poderiam permanecer em seu quartel e que a liderança civil não interferiria nas operações militares russas sugerem que estas suposições foram feitas usando a inteligência fornecida pelo 5º Departamento. Que tais suposições, se de fato foram feitas, provaram estar tão fundamentalmente fora do alvo, quando combinadas com a preparação dos militares ucranianos para engajar as colunas iniciais das forças russas, sugerem que o trabalho do 5º Departamento tinha sido interrompido pelos serviços de segurança ucranianos, que assumiram o controle das redes humanas russas e alimentaram relatórios falsos para a liderança russa.
Leia mais: A verdade sobre Bucha está por aí, mas talvez muito inconveniente para ser descoberta.
O fato é que colunas de tropas russas, avançando corajosamente para a Ucrânia sem o tipo de atenção à segurança de rotas e proteção de flancos que normalmente acompanhariam as operações ofensivas, viram-se cortadas e aniquiladas por emboscadas ucranianas bem preparadas. Além disso, ao invés de se dobrar sob pressão, o Exército ucraniano - tanto os regulares como os das forças territoriais - resistiram e lutaram, usando armas manuais anti-tanque - Javelins de fabricação norte-americana e NLAW de fabricação britânica - com grande efeito. Foi, para usar um coloquialismo americano, um tiroteio na Turquia, e o governo ucraniano fez uso efetivo de imagens de combate obtidas de tais encontros com grande efeito na formação da opinião pública global sobre a eficácia das defesas da Ucrânia.
Entretanto, as limitações das forças armadas ucranianas não lhe permitiram transformar suas impressionantes vitórias táticas em resultados operacionais e estratégicos positivos. Apesar dos caros reveses iniciais, o Exército Russo pressionou seu ataque, obtendo ganhos impressionantes no sul, onde forças russas operando fora da Crimeia asseguraram a cidade estratégica de Kherson e avançaram sobre a igualmente importante cidade de Mariupol. Lá, eles se uniram às forças russas e aliadas da República de Donetsk para cercar as forças ucranianas que defendiam Mariupol, acabando aprisionando os sobreviventes, em número de vários milhares, no submundo de concreto armado da fábrica de aço Azovstal. Mais ao norte, as forças russas, juntamente com as forças das repúblicas de Donetsk e Lugansk, avançaram para o oeste para impulsionar as forças ucranianas de suas defesas preparadas para obter o controle da totalidade do território que abrange a região de Donbass.
A "Batalha por Kiev".
Embora a garantia da integridade territorial da região de Donbass fosse um dos principais objetivos da operação militar especial russa, para realizar esta Rússia realizou extensas operações de apoio, que incluíram um avanço diverso em direção a Kiev destinado a fixar as forças ucranianas no lugar e desviar os reforços da frente oriental, bem como uma simulação anfíbia ao largo da costa de Odessa com o mesmo propósito. Para que um ataque de desvio e/ou simulação seja operacionalmente viável, ele deve ser credível, o que significa que as forças que realizam a missão devem ser agressivas na execução do desvio, mesmo em condições desfavoráveis.
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Traduzido
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Ukraine is
winning the battle on Twitter, but in the real world Kiev is losing the fight
for the Donbass
Claims that Ukraine is set for victory on the ground are
Kiev and Washington’s wishful thinking at best
FILE - In this April 9, 2021, file photo, Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits eastern Ukraine, where Russia-backed separatists
have been battling Ukrainian troops in a conflict. © (Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via AP, File)
Western media coverage of the
Ukraine conflict has been so hysterically one-sided, and divorced from
reality, that it's probably only a matter of time before Iraq's erstwhile
'Comical Ali' is brought out of retirement to insist that there are no Russians
advancing towards the Ukrainian army's front lines. Meanwhile, the actual
fighting continues to result in a string of defeats for Kiev's battered forces,
who have already lost control of two major cities, despite unprecedented
support from the US and its allies.
As American officials work with the
government of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to craft a perception
of Kiev's victory against the Russian military, Moscow
is preparing to counter with a harsh dose of reality.
US
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, on the heels of a dramatic visit to the
Ukrainian capital of Kiev where, together with Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin, he met with Zelensky, testified before
Congress that the goal of the Ukrainians in fighting their
two-month-old conflict with Russia “would
be to push the Russians out of the territory that they’re trying to occupy in
eastern Ukraine.”
Blinken added that the administration of US President Joe
Biden was providing “full
support” to Kiev to achieve this goal. The Secretary of
State added that Zelensky’s objective was to degrade the Russian military so
that it would not be able to attack Ukraine in the “next month, next year or in five years,” echoing
similar sentiments expressed by Lloyd Austin, who had declared that the goal of
the US was to “see Russia
weakened” so that it cannot “do
the kinds of things that it has done [in Ukraine].”
The shared optimism of Blinken, Austin, and Zelensky
comes from the joint embrace of a narrative of the Russian military operation
against Ukraine which holds that the Russians are in the process of suffering a
strategic defeat in Ukraine. But in a sign that this narrative may represent
little more than wishful thinking on the part of these three leaders, the US
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, had a more nuanced
take, noting that if Russia were to get away with what he termed its “aggression” against
Ukraine “cost-free,” then “the global international security
order” that has been in place since the end of the Second
World War would be put at risk.
Far from
projecting a sense of optimism as to the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian
conflict, Milley’s statements reflected a sense of urgency that comes with the
recognition that the war in Ukraine has reached a critical juncture.
The gap
between perception and reality when it comes to assessing the Russian-Ukrainian
conflict is a direct result of the confusing nature of the conflict itself,
where a well-oiled propaganda campaign waged by Ukraine and its Western
partners, both government and media alike, contrasts with a Russian public
relations effort which is reticent to delve deeply into Russian strategic goals
and objectives, let alone the day-to-day details of the fighting on the ground.
The result is an information war where two competing narratives wage an unequal
conflict, and perception is ultimately trumped by reality.
Some harsh truths
As the military operation in Ukraine enters its third
month, some harsh truths have emerged which are altering how both the Russian
armed forces and modern warfare will be assessed going forward. Few
analysts — including this author — expected serious resistance to last more
than a month. Indeed, General Milley had briefed Congress
during closed-door briefings in early February that a full-scale Russian
invasion of Ukraine could result in the fall of Kiev within 72 hours.
There were several reasons for such an assessment. First and foremost was the extensive preparation that had been conducted by Russia in advance of the military incursion. The movement of hundreds of thousands of troops along with their equipment and the logistical means to sustain both men and material in combat is not a trivial exercise, and Russia had been engaged in military drills which stretched out over the course of several months, perfecting such logistics. The Russian military is led by officers who excel in staff work and preparation, and to assume that they had planned for every possibility that could be encountered on the battlefield is not an outlandish proposition.
Doctrinally,
the Russian military was configured for the kind of warfare it had prepared
for, where its overwhelming advantages in mass and firepower were optimized to
produce the very battlefield results anticipated by most observers — the
destruction of enemy defenses in depth with massed fire, followed by an
aggressive armored assault that penetrated deep into the enemy rear areas,
sowing confusion and disruption leading to the rapid loss of combat
effectiveness on the part of those being attacked.
A Russian-Ukrainian war was always going to be primarily
a ground war; neither the Ukrainian Air Force nor its Navy was expected to put
up a sustained, viable resistance to their Russian counterparts. While the
Ukrainian Army had been trained and equipped as a virtual NATO proxy force
since 2015, the reality was that it had undergone a rapid
expansion from 2014, when it could field some 6,000 combat-ready troops, to its
pre-military operation composition of some 150,000 soldiers organized into
24 brigades. The expectation that Ukraine would be able to perfect anything
more than basic battalion-sized combined arms operations (i.e., the coordinated
employment of maneuver forces with artillery and air support) was wishful
thinking.
While Ukraine
had placed a great deal of effort in transitioning from an all-conscript
military in 2014 to one where some 60% of its combat personnel were
professional contract soldiers led by seasoned non-commissioned officers, one
cannot create such a force in so short of time. Small unit leadership of the
sort that represents the glue that holds a military force together under the
strain and duress of sustained combat simply had not had enough time to take
hold and mature in the Ukrainian army, leading many to assess that it would fold
when placed under the stress of Russian doctrinal warfare.
The following
analysis is sourced from publicly-available reporting by journalists embedded
with the Russian military and the forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic, as
well as Russian Ministry of Defense briefings and statements made by the
Ukrainian side.
Within the
first week of the Russian operation getting underway, it was clear to most that
many of the assumptions that had been made were flawed and/or misplaced. First
and foremost, Moscow had opted not to employ its forces according to standard
doctrine, opting instead to take a light approach, which appeared to be born
from a concerted effort to minimize civilian casualties and harm to civilian
infrastructure that itself was derived from a fundamental misunderstanding of
the reality of the situation on the ground in Ukraine.
The reported purging of 150 officers from the 5th Department of the Russian Federal
Security Service (FSB), responsible for operations in the so-called 'near
abroad' (which
includes Ukraine), along with the arrest of Sergei Beseda, the former head of
the department, suggests that Russia had suffered a failure of intelligence the
likes of which has not been seen since the Israeli failure to predict the
Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973.
While the
Russian government has remained characteristically tight-lipped about any
possible shortcomings regarding the work of the 5th Department prior to the
start of the military operation, the statements by Russian leadership
suggesting that the Ukrainian military might remain in its barracks and that
civilian leadership would not interfere with Russia military operations suggest
that these assumptions were made using intelligence provided by the 5th
Department. That such assumptions, if indeed they were made, proved to be so
fundamentally off target, when combined with the preparedness of the Ukrainian
military to engage the initial columns of Russian forces, suggests that the
work of the 5th Department had been disrupted by Ukrainian security services,
who took control of Russian human networks and fed false reports back to the
Russian leadership.
The fact is that columns of Russian
troops, advancing boldly into Ukraine without the kind of attention to route
security and flank protection that would normally accompany offensive
operations, found themselves cut off and annihilated by well-prepared Ukrainian
ambushes. Moreover, instead of folding under pressure, the Ukrainian Army —
both regular and those from the territorial forces — stood their ground and
fought, using hand-held anti-tank weapons— US-made Javelins and British-made
NLAWs— to great effect. It was, to use an American colloquialism, a Turkey
shoot, and the Ukrainian government made effective use of combat footage
obtained from such encounters to great effect in shaping global public opinion
about the effectiveness of Ukraine’s defenses.
However, the limitations of the
Ukrainian armed forces did not allow it to turn its impressive tactical
victories into positive operational and strategic outcomes. Despite costly
initial setbacks, the Russian Army pressed home its attack, achieving impressive
gains in the south, where Russian forces operating out of Crimea secured the
strategic city of Kherson and advanced on the equally important city of
Mariupol. There, they joined with Russian and allied forces from the Donetsk
Republic to surround the Ukrainian forces defending Mariupol, eventually
trapping the survivors, numbering several thousand strong, in the reinforced
concrete underworld of the Azovstal steel factory. Further north, Russian
forces, together with the forces of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics, advanced
westward to drive Ukrainian forces from their prepared defenses to gain control
of the totality of the territory encompassing the Donbass region.
The “Battle for Kiev”
While securing the territorial
integrity of the Donbass region was one of the primary objectives of the
Russian special military operation, to accomplish this Russia carried out
extensive supporting operations, which included a diversionary advance toward Kiev
designed to fix Ukrainian forces in place and divert reinforcements away from
the eastern front, as well as an amphibious feint off the coast of Odessa for
the same purpose. For a diversionary attack and/or feint to be operationally
viable, it must be believable, which means the forces carrying out the mission
must be aggressive in the execution of the diversion, even under unfavorable
conditions.
The Russian
advance on Kiev was done by a force of some 40,000 men operating on two axes,
one heading south, the other pushing southwest from the direction of Chernihiv.
The ground advances were preceded by several
air assaults targeting airfields in the vicinity of Kiev. Whether or not
Russian intelligence had indicated that Kiev was ripe for a coup de main, or the Russian
paratroopers and special forces conducting the assaults were too aggressive in
selling the attack, or a combination of both, the reality was that Kiev was
well defended by a mix of regular army and territorial forces who were not
inclined to give up the Ukrainian capital without a fight. For over a month,
the Russian forces advanced on Kiev, launching probing attacks that penetrated
the northern suburbs and threatened to surround the city from both the east and
west.
The fact of the matter remains, however, that a force of
40,000 men, no matter how aggressively employed, cannot take, and hold, a city
of some three million inhabitants defended by a mix of 60,000 regular, reserve,
and territorial soldiers. But this was never their task. “These actions [i.e., the advance on
Kiev],” Colonel General Sergey Rudskoy, the first deputy chief
of Russia’s General Staff, announced during
a briefing on March 26, “are
carried out with the aim of causing such damage to military infrastructure,
equipment, personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the results of which allow
us not only to tie down their forces and prevent them from strengthening their
grouping in the Donbass, but also will not allow them to do this until the
Russian army completely liberates the territories of the [Donetsk People’s
Republic] and [Lugansk People’s Republic].”
In an indication of both the intensity of the combat involved in
the Kiev feint, and the importance of the assigned mission, Russian President
Vladimir Putin awarded the honorific title of ‘Guard’ to the 64th Detached
Motor Rifle Brigade for its “astute
and bold actions” during the Kiev fighting. “The unit’s staff became a role model in
fulfilling its military duty, valor, dedication and professionalism,” Putin
noted in the accompanying citation (the Ukrainian government has accused the
64th Brigade of committing war crimes in the town of Bucha, north of Kiev, a
charge the Russian government vehemently denies.)
The so-called “Battle
for Kiev” is a clear-cut example of the difference between
perception and reality. The Ukrainian position is that its forces decisively
defeated the Russian military on the approaches to Kiev, forcing not only a retreat,
but also a complete re-design of the strategic objectives of the special
military operation. This point of view has been echoed unquestioningly by a
compliant Western media, and embraced by political and military leaders in
Europe, Canada, and the US.
One of the major outcomes of this Ukrainian “victory” was the
ability of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to leverage this perception
into a fundamental shift of thinking on the part of his supporters in the West,
resulting in an increase in both the amount of money allocated to supplying
Ukraine with weapons, as well as the quality of the weapons themselves, as the
West shifted away from an emphasis on light anti-tank weapons to more
conventional armor and artillery.
Left unspoken
was the need for this dramatic change in weapons priority, especially given the
fact that Ukraine had, according to its own narrative, decisively defeated
Russia using these very same light anti-tank weapons. The reality, however, was
that the Russian Phase One operations had inflicted near-fatal damage to the
Ukrainian military, killing and wounding tens of thousands of soldiers while
destroying the vast bulk of Ukraine’s heavy weaponry — the artillery, tanks,
and armored fighting vehicles critical to waging modern combined arms warfare.
The reason Ukraine requested more tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery from
its Western suppliers is that it had depleted its available stocks.
But equipment was the least of Ukraine’s worries. A military is only as good as its ability to logistically sustain its forces while in combat, and one of the primary objectives of the Russian Phase One campaign was to destroy Ukraine’s fuel and ammunition storage facilities and degrade Ukrainian command and control. The result is that while Ukraine held onto Kiev, it did so at an enormous cost in overall combat effectiveness. And while Russia was able to withdraw from the Kiev front and undergo a period of rest, rearmament, and reorientation (a normal action for military units that had been engaged in virtually non-stop combat operations for a month), the Ukrainian military remained under pressure from incessant Russian aerial attack and bombardment from precision-guided cruise missiles and Russian artillery.
Perception, when subjected to the harsh light of reality,
is exposed as little more than wishful thinking. This is very much the case
regarding the so-called “Battle
for Kiev,” where the Ukrainian military was left holding
territory which no longer served any useful purpose for the Russians. Russia
was able to redeploy its forces to better support its prime objective, the
seizure of Donbass, leaving the Ukrainian forces in Kiev frozen in place.
Mariupol and the battle for Donbass
The battle for
Mariupol is another example where perception management clashed with
ground-truth reality. The narrative surrounding the present fate of Mariupol is
very much a tale of two cities. From the Ukrainian perspective, the city
continues to be held by a heroic cadre of fighters who are tying down tens of
thousands of Russian forces who otherwise could be redeployed elsewhere,
supporting the Russian main effort against Donbass. So long as these defenders
hold out, the Ukrainians contend, the vital land bridge connecting Crimea and
the Russian Federation will be at risk. Likewise, their continued
resistance serves a major propaganda purpose, denying Russia the ability to
declare victory prior to the Victory Day celebration of May 9.
Russia, however, has already
declared victory in Mariupol. While conceding that a few thousand defenders
remain dug into the Cold War-era bunkers underneath the Azovstal steel factory,
Russia says that these forces serve no meaningful military value. Indeed,
rather than sacrifice Russian troops to dig the Ukrainian forces from their
underground lairs, President Putin directed the military to seal off the Azov
facility and wait the defenders out.
There is no doubt that the presence
of Ukrainians in the Azovstal factory represents a propaganda victory for
Ukraine. But the reality is that the city of Mariupol has fallen to Russia;
while the Ukrainian defenders, possibly accompanied by thousands of civilians,
waste away as their food supplies diminish, the rest of Mariupol is beginning
the task of rebuilding a shattered city where an estimated 90% of the buildings
have been damaged or destroyed in brutal street-to-street fighting. The Russian land bridge is intact, and the Russian
offensive against Donbass is proceeding without delay.
The statements in Kiev by Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin are a byproduct of the perception of Ukrainian victory shaped by the twin Ukrainian “victories” in Kiev and Mariupol. The reality, however, is that Kiev was a masterful Russian deception that shaped the overall strategic situation in Ukraine in favor of Russia, and the Mariupol battle is likewise finished in terms of any strategic impact on the overall campaign. What is left is the harsh truth of simple “military math” which, when projected onto a map, provides the kind of unyielding fact-based evidence that Ukraine is losing its war with Russia.
The fact of
the matter is that the military aid being provided to Ukraine by the West will
not have any discernable impact on a battlefield where Russia is asserting its
dominance more and more each day. Not only is there not enough equipment being
provided. Hundreds of armored vehicles cannot replace the more than 2,580 that
have been lost by Ukraine to date, nor can dozens of artillery pieces offset the
more that 1,410 artillery tubes and rocket launchers destroyed by the Russian
military.
When two
military forces of equal size and capability face off against one another, they
seek to acquire an operational advantage through the attrition of their opponent’s
capabilities which, in combination with effective maneuvering of their own
forces, puts the opponent in an untenable situation. The transition from a
battle of equals to decisive military victory is often rapid, representing as
it does the culmination of acquired supremacy in the form of firepower and
maneuver which is brought together in synchronistic fashion, creating a series
of tactical and operational dilemmas for which the opponent has no viable
solution.
This is the
current situation with the Ukrainian military facing off against the Russians
in Donbass today. The Ukrainians, lacking any meaningful artillery support of
their own, are at the mercy of the Russian artillery and rocket launchers that
pound their positions day in and day out, without respite. The Russian troops
have taken a very deliberate approach to engaging with their Ukrainian
opponents. Gone are the rapid advances by unprotected columns and convoys; now,
the Russians isolate the Ukrainian defenders, pound them with artillery, and then
carefully close in and destroy what remains with infantry supported by tanks
and armored fighting vehicles. The casualty ratio in this fighting is
unforgiving for Ukraine, with hundreds of soldiers lost each day in terms of
killed, wounded and surrendered, while Russian casualties are measured in
scores.
Not only can Russia maneuver virtually at will along the front as it closes with and destroys the Ukrainian defenders, but Russian troops also operate with absolute freedom in depth, meaning that they can pull back to refit, rearm, and rest without fear of Ukrainian artillery fire or counterattacking forces. The Ukrainians, meanwhile, remain pinned down, unable to move without fear of being detected and destroyed by Russian air power, and as such doomed to be isolated and destroyed by Russian troops in due course.
There is virtually no hope of
reinforcement or relief for the Ukrainian forces operating on the front lines;
Russia has interdicted the rail lines that had served as the conduit for
resupply, and the likelihood of any Ukrainian forces which have received heavy
weapons provided by the West reaching the frontlines in any discernable
strength is virtually zero. The Battle for Donbass is reaching its culminating
point, where the Ukrainian military rapidly transitions from a force capable of
providing the semblance of resistance to one that has lost all meaningful
combat capability.
This is the
state of play entering the third month of Russia’s military operation in
Ukraine. While the termination of any conflict is always a political question,
one thing is for certain — if the operation extends into a fourth month, the
battlefield will look vastly different from the one that the world currently
sees. The battle for Donbass and eastern Ukraine is all but over. That is the
hard reality, and no amount of wishful thinking or perception management by
either Zelensky or his American partners can change that.
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